Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Tony Towers and PG Distributed Proofreaders
By G. Lowes Dickinson
1916
1. INTRODUCTION
Europe since the Fifteenth Century—Machiavellianism—Empire and the
Balance of Power
2. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE ENTENTE
Belgian Dispatches of 1905-14.
3. GREAT BRITAIN
The Policy of Great Britain—Essentially an Overseas Power
4. FRANCE
The Policy of France since 1870—Peace and Imperialism—Conflicting
Elements
5. RUSSIA
The Policy of Russia—Especially towards Austria
6. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
The Policy of Austria-Hungary—Especially towards the Balkans
7. GERMANY
The Policy of Germany—From 1866 to the Decade 1890-1900—A Change
8. OPINION IN GERMANY
German "Romanticism"—New Ambitions.
9. OPINION ABOUT GERMANY
Bourdon—Beyens—Cambon—Summary
10. GERMAN POLICY FROM THE DECADE 1890-1900
Relation to Great Britain—The Navy.
11. VAIN ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY
Great Britain's Efforts for Arbitration—Mutual Suspicion
13. GERMANY AND TURKEY The Bagdad Railway
16. THE LAST YEARS
Before the War—The Outbreak of War
17. THE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL
The Pursuit of Power and Wealth
19. THE CHANGE NEEDED Change of Outlook and Change of System—An International League—International Law and Control
1. Introduction.
In the great and tragic history of Europe there is a turning-point thatmarks the defeat of the ideal of a world-order and the definite acceptanceof international anarchy. That turning-point is the emergence of thesovereign State at the end of the fifteenth century. And it is symbolicalof all that was to follow that at that point stands, looking down thevista of the centuries, the brilliant and sinister figure of Machiavelli.From that date onwards international policy has meant Machiavellianism.Sometimes the masters of the craft, like Catherine de Medici or Napoleon,have avowed it; sometimes, like Frederick the Great, they have disclaimedit. But always they have practised it. They could not, indeed, practiseanything else. For it is as true of an aggregation of States as of anaggregation of individuals that, whatever moral sentiments may prevail, ifthere is no common law and no common force the best intentions will bedefeated by lack of confidence and security. Mutual fear and mutualsuspicion, aggression masquerading as defence and defence masquerading asaggression, will be the protagonists in the bloody drama; and there willbe, what Hobbes truly asserted to be the essence of such a situation, achronic state of war, open or veiled. For peace itself will be a latentwar; and the more the States arm to prevent a conflict the more certainlywill it be provoked, since to one or another it will always seem a bette