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WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF MEMBERS AND FELLOWS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS
SECOND SERIES VOLUME XI
CHICAGO
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
1903
Copyright, 1903
BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
This volume presents some results of the work done in thematter of logical theory in the Department of Philosophy ofthe University of Chicago in the first decade of its existence.The eleven Studies are the work of eight different hands,all, with the exception of the editor, having at some periodheld Fellowships in this University, Dr. Heidel in Greek,the others in Philosophy. Their names and present pursuitsare indicated in the Table of Contents. The editorhas occasionally, though rarely, added a footnote or phrasewhich might serve to connect one Study more closely withanother. The pages in the discussion of Hypothesis, onMill and Whewell, are by him. With these exceptions,each writer is individually and completely responsible forhis own Study.
The various Studies present, the editor believes, aboutthe relative amount of agreement and disagreement that isnatural in view of the conditions of their origin. Thevarious writers have been in contact with one another inSeminars and lecture courses in pursuit of the same topics,and have had to do with shaping one another's views.There are several others, not represented in this volume,who have also participated in the evolution of the point ofview herein set forth, and to whom the writers acknowledgetheir indebtedness. The disagreements proceed from thediversity of interests with which the different writers approachthe logical topic; and from the fact that the pointof view in question is still (happily) developing and showingno signs of becoming a closed system.
If the Studies themselves do not give a fair notion of the[Pg x]nature and degree of the harmony in the different writers'methods, a preface is not likely to succeed in so doing. A fewwords may be in place, however, about a matter repeatedlytouched upon, but nowhere consecutively elaborated—themore ultimate philosophical bearing of what is set forth. Allagree, the editor takes the liberty of saying, that judgment isthe central function of knowing, and hence affords the centralproblem of logic; that since the act of knowing is intimatelyand indissolubly connected with the like yet diverse functionsof affection, appreciation, and practice, it only distorts resultsreached to treat knowing as a self-inclosed and self-explanatorywhole—hence the intimate connections of logical theorywith functional psychology; that since knowledge appearsas a function within experience, and yet passes judgmentupon both the processes and contents of other functions, itswork and aim must be distinctively reconstructive or transformatory;that since Reality must be defined in terms ofexperience, judgment appears accordingly as the mediumthrough which the consciously effected evolution of Realitygoes on; that there is no reasonable standard of truth (or ofsuccess of the knowing function) in general, except upon thepostulate that Reality is thus dynamic or self-evolving, and,in particular, except through reference to th